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Abstract 
Studies in psychology have long argued the possibility that sibling structure, such as birth 
order and the gender of siblings, shapes one’s feminine and masculine personality traits, such 
as a preference for competition. In light of recent developments in the economics literature on 
the gender gap, this implies that familial environment could explain why some women do opt 
for competition, while the vast majority of women do not and, thus, are underrepresented on 
the career ladder. By conducting a controlled experiment on Japanese high school students, 
this study quantifies the impact of sibling structure on one’s preference for competition, and 
examines whether a long-debated sibling hypothesis in psychology is supported from the 
viewpoint of experimental economics. Consistent with the hypothesis, our results reveal that 
men with older sisters were significantly less likely to enter a competitive environment 
compared with only sons. This effect is comparable in size to the effect of being female on 
the decision to compete. Our study also found moderate evidence that women with younger 
brothers were more likely to compete than only daughters. 
 
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C91, D03, J16 
Keywords: Sibling competition, Gender gap, Preference for competition, Experiment 
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1. Introduction 
Despite numerous attempts to do away with the professional gender gap over the 
past decades, the so-called “glass-ceiling” on the corporate ladder is still firmly in place 
in many countries. According to LABORASTA and Eurostat Database, in 2010, the 
proportion of women in the workplace was similar across countries, ranging from 
41.6% in Korea to 47.5% in France. On the other hand, the proportion of women in 
managerial positions in the same year was substantially lower and varied significantly 
across countries, ranging from 10.1% in Korea to 30–39% in European nations. Recent 
developments in the labor economics literature have made a significant contribution in 
unfolding the reason behind this gender gap in promotions, showing that otherwise 
qualified women shy away from competitive environments simply because they dislike 
competition (Niederle and Vesturlund, 2007). A novel component of the Niederle and 
Vesturlund study (2007) was its method of extracting individuals’ true preference for 
competition by using a controlled experiment, where subjects were incentivized with 
pecuniary rewards. In particular, Niedlerle and Vesturlund (2007) asked students at the 
University of Pittsburgh to engage in math-solving tasks under several payment 
schemes, including a competitive tournament scheme, and showed that women were 
significantly less likely to enter into such a competitive environment. Given their results, 
an important means for increasing female representation in the corporate arena is to find 
ways to induce these “shy” women to voluntarily opt for competition.  
To this end, subsequent studies have focused on whether women’s negative 
attitudes toward competition are driven by nature or by nurture, as this could then 
dictate potential changes in policy. For example, if the gender difference in preference 
for competition is innate and thus constituted from biological factors, institutional 
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interventions to increase female representation, such as affirmative action, would be 
justified because such traits are not controlled by institutions. 7  Conversely, if 
environmental or social factors contribute to such a preference it would lend support for 
educational reforms to prompt social learning in women.  
In an influential study suggesting for environmental factors in this preference for 
competition, Gneezy et al. (2009) conducted a simple experiment in a patriarchal tribe, 
the Maasai, and a matrilineal tribe, the Khasi. They found that Maasai men opted for 
competition significantly more often than Maasai women did, while Khasi women 
chose competition more often than Khasi men did. This gender difference between the 
tribes suggests the importance of socially defined gender roles in shaping attitudes 
toward competition. Similarly, a series of studies by Alison Booth and her co-authors 
revealed that single-sex schools or classrooms nurture more competitive attitudes and 
encourage risk-taking behavior in women (Booth et al., 2014; Booth and Nolen, 2012a, 
2012b; Booth et al., 2011).8 There is also evidence that suggests that having same-sex 
instructors in introductory math or science courses encourages women to major in math 
or engineering (Carrell et al., 2010), indicating that having a same-sex role model is an 
environmental factor that could induce women to make choices that they otherwise 
would not. 
     This paper designed a laboratory experiment to determine whether the gender gap 
in preference for competition arises from another environmental factor, namely familial 
                                                   
7 ‘By-nature’ studies reported that gender differences in competitive attitudes are influenced by the 
fluctuation of sex hormones (Buser, 2012; Wozniak et al., 2014; Guéguen, 2012; Dreber and Hoffman, 
2007; Archer, 2006; Hoffman and Gneezy, 2010). Prenatal exposure to male sex hormones is also known 
to predict long-term profitability in financial traders in the City of London (Coates et al., 2009) and 
performance in sports, such as rankings for sumo-wrestlers (Tamiya et al., 2012).  
8 Fryer and Levitt (2012) obtained evidence suggesting that gender inequality translates into poor female 
math performance only after excluding participants from Islamic countries where classrooms are 
segregated by gender.  
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environment, to which little attention has been paid in the economics literature. In 
particular, we examined whether sibling structure, such as birth-order or the gender of 
other siblings, shapes one’s propensity to compete.  
Sibling structure may be an especially important environmental contributor to 
personality because, according to some psychologists, through interactions with their 
siblings, some women may grow to willingly take part in competition. Based on an 
observational study by Koch (1954) on primary school students and their siblings, Brim 
(1958) reported a tendency for mixed-gender sibling pairs to assimilate traits more 
typically associated with the opposite-sex. For instance, older girls with younger 
brothers are reported to have more masculine traits than their counterparts who have 
younger sisters, with masculine traits defined as characteristics like “competitiveness” 
or “self-confidence.” Similarly, boys with older sisters are considered to be substantially 
more feminine than their counterparts with older brothers, feminine traits constituting 
more expressive characteristics such as “kindness” or “friendliness.”9 Interestingly, this 
effect was stronger in older sister and younger brother pairs compared with older 
brother and younger sister pairs. While the interaction among cross-gender sibling pairs 
alone could not explain this particular trend, similar phenomena specific to the 
relationship of older sisters and younger brothers have been raised in other 
psychological studies (ex. Stewart, 1982).  
Sulloway (1996) provides a possible explanation for this trend by suggesting 
that the effects unique to an older sister / younger brother relationship arise as a result of 
a mixture of birth order and role-taking. Sulloway’s (1996) rationale for the effect of 
birth order on personality traits is based on the idea of sibling competition in 
                                                   
9 Feminine or masculine traits were identified from teachers’ ratings of their students, based on a 
personality classification used in several empirical studies (Brim, 1958). 
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evolutionary science. Based on Darwin’s principle of divergence, Sulloway (1996) 
argues that siblings differ in their strategies for attracting parental investment depending 
on their birth order, which eventually comes to shape their personality traits. 
Specifically, first-born children tend to be more dominant, aggressive, and ambitious, as 
well as more conservative than later-born children. This is in order to meet their parents’ 
expectations and standards, thereby defending their stakes against younger rivals in 
regards to their parents’ allocation of resources (Sulloway, 1996).10 Thus, first-born 
children, regardless if they are male or female, act as the “alpha-male” in their sibling 
system (Sulloway, 1996). This could then explain why Brim (1958) observed the 
stronger “role-taking effect” in older sister / younger brother pairs than for older brother 
/ younger sister pairs.  
However, not all psychologists agree with the view that sibling dynamics, 
especially birth order, have systematic influences on personality traits. In fact, this is 
one of the longest debated issues in psychology. While birth order effects on personality 
were first observed as early by Adler (1928), and have since been tested in thousands of 
studies, a review of the literature by Ernst and Angst (1983) concluded that there were 
only negligible birth order effects across personality variables. However, subsequent 
studies, including Sulloway (1996), have attacked the critique by Ernst and Angst 
(1983). One of the core issues at play is who rated the participants’ personality traits in 
each of the studies. Some investigations reported observations consistent with Sulloway 
(1996) when personality traits were rated by family members, but not when they were 
rated by peers or by the subject him or herself (Jefferson et al., 1998; Paulhus et al., 
1999; Saroglou and Fiasse, 2003). However, other studies compared several ratings (self, 
                                                   
10 Studies have empirically confirmed this birth order theory by directly comparing personality traits 
(Sulloway and Zweigenhaft, 2010; Healey and Ellis, 2007). 
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peer, and parent) of personality traits and found no difference between these ratings 
(Marini and Kurtz, 2011).  
This paper goes beyond these past psychological studies by obtaining information 
regarding one of the key personality traits, preference for competition, using a 
controlled experiment similar to that used by Niederele and Vesturlund (2007), rather 
than through subjective ratings. In our experiment, Japanese high school students were 
asked to solve as many mazes as possible in several tasks with different payment 
schemes. In order to examine whether individuals opt for a competitive environment, 
the experimenter asked subjects to select whether they wanted to be compensated under 
a piece-rate or tournament before they started solving mazes. Since the reward under the 
tournament scheme depended on the performance of the other members in a randomly 
assigned group, entry into a tournament represents a voluntary choice for a competitive 
environment. We then examined what factors, including sibling structure, accounted for 
tournament choice, and tested whether a long-debated sibling hypothesis in psychology 
is supported from the viewpoint of experimental economics.  
Our study supports the implications stated in Sulloway (1996): males who have 
older sisters are significantly less likely to choose a tournament scheme than males who 
have no siblings, while females with younger brothers were more likely to choose 
tournaments than only daughters were. The magnitude of the effect of sibling structure 
on competition preference are quite large, with the older sister effect alone cancelling 
out the typical aversion to tournament entry generally observed among females.  
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2. Methods 
2-1. Participants 
One hundred and thirty-five students from four high schools in the Kyoto area of 
Japan participated in the study. Participants attended one of four sessions that took place 
on July 16 and 22 and October 1, 2011. Five confederates took part in the experiment to 
make up for last-minute participant cancellations, as the experiment had to be conducted 
in groups of four. Data from the confederates were eliminated from the analysis, 
although the exclusion of data from subjects who happened to be in the same group as 
the confederates did not significantly affect the results. Each subject was assigned to a 
group of four participants and had to solve as many mazes as possible under several 
payment schemes. Subjects sat in individual booths and were not told where the other 
members of their group sat or how the others performed until the end of the experiment. 
It should be noted that students in the current study had relatively fewer siblings than 
the average number of siblings (1.46) reported in the Japanese Survey on Household 
Trends (JSHT) conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. Thus, the 
present sample has relatively lower variation in sibling composition than a larger 
representative of teenagers in Japan. 
 
2-2. Experimental design and procedure 
Experimental design largely followed the framework used by Niederle and 
Versturlund (2007). The experiment consisted of a practice session and six tasks. In the 
practice session, subjects solved mazes on a computer screen for one minute to learn the 
solutions to the mazes. Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the subjects’ display. Subjects 
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moved cursors from the start to the goal point by using arrow keys on their keyboard. 
They could skip as many mazes as they wanted by clicking a skip button on their screen 
to move to the next maze. They received no payment for their performance in the 
practice session. After completing the practice session, subjects moved on to the actual 
tasks, where they were required to solve as many mazes as possible in three minutes 
under different payment schemes. In Task 1, subjects were paid on a piece rate: they 
received 25 points for every correctly solved maze. Task 2 employed a tournament 
payment scheme: the subject who correctly solved the largest number of mazes in each 
group received 100 points for every correctly solved maze, while the other three 
members received zero points. Since points earned under the tournament payment 
scheme depended on the performance of the other three members in the same group, 
subjects were exposed to a competitive environment under the tournament payment 
scheme. The two payment schemes were repeated in Tasks 3 and 4, as improvements in 
performance between the two payment schemes could reflect a learning effect rather 
than an actual response to competition. In Task 5, subjects were asked to choose 
whether they wanted to be paid under a piece-rate or tournament scheme before solving 
the mazes. The choice in Task 5 was then used to measure each subject’s propensity to 
compete.  
Importantly, just because a subject chooses to participate in the tournament 
scheme in Task 5, it does not immediately indicate that he or she prefers competition. 
The choice in Task 5 can also reflect factors not directly related to the preference for 
competition. For example, some might choose the tournament scheme because they 
overestimate their relative abilities in a group (overconfidence). Others might choose 
the piece-rate scheme because they are risk-averse (risk aversion) or dislike being 
10 
 
informed about their performance relative to others (feedback aversion). It is also 
possible that some subjects choose the tournament because they know that their 
maze-solving abilities are sufficiently high (performance level).  
The goal of implementing Task 6 was to reveal whether the participants’ 
decision to compete in Task 5 could be explained solely by the reasons mentioned above 
or because subjects had a higher preference for competition. In Task 6, subjects were 
asked to choose whether they wanted to be compensated under the piece-rate or 
tournament scheme for their performance in Task 3, the second piece-rate task. If 
participants chose the piece-rate scheme, they received 25 points for every correctly 
solved maze in Task 3; if they chose the tournament scheme, they received 100 points 
for every correctly solved maze in Task 3 if they were the best performer and zero 
points if they were not. Because this payment was based on their past performance, 
subjects did not solve any mazes in Task 6 but speculated on their relative performance 
within the group. Thus, participants’ choices in Task 6 were influenced by factors such 
as overconfidence, risk-aversion, feedback aversion, and performance level, but not by 
the preference for competition (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Conversely, choices in 
Task 5 involved actual competition as well as speculation on their relative performance. 
Thus, the decision to enter competition in Task 5 could be seen as reflecting individual 
tastes for participating in competitions, in addition to overconfidence, risk aversion, and 
feedback aversion. By examining the differences in payment scheme choices between 
Tasks 5 and 6, individual preferences for competition would be revealed.  
After completing Tasks 1–5, subjects were asked to guess their rank in their 
group by entering the subjective probability distribution of their rank. For example, a 
subject would type 100% for rank 1 and 0% for ranks 2 to 4 if he or she was very 
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confident that he or she was the best performer in the group. The estimated expected 
ranks were then used to infer the extent of overconfidence for analysis. Unlike in 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), subjects were not paid for each correct guess of their 
rank.11  
To accurately evaluate participants’ attitudes toward competition, students were 
incentivized in the following way. At the end of the experiment, subjects drew a lottery 
and randomly selected one task among the six for which the reward was actually given. 
Students were paid according to the points earned in the selected task, plus 500 points 
for a participation fee. Subjects were given prizes for their points instead of cash 
because cash transactions were prohibited by the high schools. The prizes consisted of 
various stationery items, and subjects received different combinations of these items 
depending on their performance.12 Special care was taken not to mention the specific 
prizes that subjects would receive until the end of the experiment because the subjective 
value of the prizes could vary across subjects; subjects were simply told to earn as many 
points as possible.  
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to complete a 
questionnaire asking about demographic information, including sibling composition. 
The information was used to examine the extent to which sibling structure 
systematically affected a subject’s choice for the tournament scheme in Tasks 5 and 6, 
thereby revealing their preference for competition.  
                                                   
11 This is due to the fact that some students chose a strategy of solving no mazes and picked rank 4 in our 
early version of the experiment.  
12 Prizes were selected with permission from the high schools. Prizes included three colored clips (25 
points), a clear folder (50 points), memo-pad (100 points), five colored pens (500 points), a mechanical 
pencil plus a plastic school bag (1000 points), and a fabric school bag (1500 points). At the end of 
experiment, students received a combination of these rewards. 100 points are roughly equivalent to 100 
JPY, which is about 1 USD at the time of writing.  
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3. Results 
3-1. Testing Sibling Hypothesis  
Figure 2 presents the proportion of participants who chose to compete in the 
tournament in Task 5 by gender and sibling composition. The graphs are consistent with 
the sibling hypothesis suggested by Brim (1958) and Sulloway (1996). Despite the fact 
that men generally entered the tournament more often than women did, the gender gap 
was remarkably reduced when certain groups of subjects were compared. For example, 
while 38% of men who have an older sister entered the tournament in Task 5, 39% of 
women who have a younger brother also chose the tournament scheme. However, the 
variation in preference for competition by sibling composition is not immediately 
evident in Figure 2. As mentioned in section 2, the raw differences in tournament choice 
could indicate variation in the other confounding factors, such as overconfidence, risk 
aversion, feedback aversion, and performance level.  
For this reason, we formally tested our hypothesis by estimating a probit model 
of payment scheme choice at Task 5, where the dependent variable equaled one if a 
subject chose the tournament payment scheme and zero otherwise. This model controls 
for performance level, as well as the tournament choice at Task 6 (e.g., overconfidence, 
risk aversion, feedback aversion). Since the choice at Task 6 did not involve the 
maze-solving task, but because subjects still had to speculate on how many mazes the 
other members in their group solved, controlling for the tournament choice at Task 6 
removes the factors other than preference for competition. Performance in Tasks 3 and 4 
was used to measure the actual performance level of subjects in order to alleviate any 
learning effects, as the number of correctly solved mazes increased in later tasks, as 
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reported in Table 1.  
Table 2 shows the estimated marginal effects from probit models of tournament 
choice in Task 5, where sibling composition dummies and their interactions with a 
female dummy are included in columns (a) and (b). The baseline for sibling 
composition dummies is “only sons.” Columns (a) confirms that sibling composition 
significantly affected the decision to enter the tournament in Task 5 using a probit 
estimation. For instance, having older or younger sisters significantly reduced the 
probability of a male entering the tournament compared with men who are only sons. 
Similarly, the estimated coefficient for women who have younger brothers is 
significantly positive (0.314), although the total effect of having younger brothers 
compared with being an only daughter (0.314 and -0.327) only moderately differs from 
zero (p-value = 0.0973). In column (b), these effects remained after controlling for 
performance level and choice of tournament entry in Task 6, except for the effect of 
men with younger sisters. Conditional upon performance level and the decision in Task 
6, compared with only sons, having older sisters reduced men’s propensity to select the 
tournament scheme by 35%. This decrease is comparable to the negative effect of being 
female on tournament choice (-0.371). Having younger brothers increased the 
probability of women entering the tournament, although the total effect is only 
marginally significant (p-value = 0.1108).13  
As a reference, columns (c), (d), and (e) report estimation results similar to 
Niederle and Vesturlund (2007), testing whether women shy away from competition 
simply because they dislike it. According to column (a), women are 37.6% less likely 
than men to select the tournament scheme. This significant gender effect remains even 
                                                   
13 However, note that a coefficient of “Has any younger brothers” is not significantly estimated.  
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after controlling for subjects’ performance level, as well as other general factors such as 
the extent of overconfidence listed in columns (d) and (e). This suggests that women did 
not enter the tournament in Task 5 because of the other factors (e.g., overconfidence, 
risk aversion, feedback aversion, performance level) as was concluded in the Niederle 
and Vesturlund study (2007). The estimated negative effect of being female on 
tournament choice in column (e) is twice that found in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007).  
The Appendix Table presents similar results as Table 2, but with the dependent 
variable replaced by tournament choice in Task 6, where no maze-solving activity was 
involved. No significant effects were found for either the female dummy or the sibling 
composition dummies in the Appendix Table, indicating that differences relating to 
sibling composition were due to personal preference for competition, not to 
performance level, and the other factors. This is consistent with our findings in Table 2, 
where the size of negative effect of being female remains similar across specifications. 
Thus, preference for competition plays a major role in explaining the differences by 
gender and sibling composition in tournament entry in Task 5. 
Table 3 tests several hypotheses that attempt to explain why sibling composition, 
such as having an older sister, may affect preference for competitive environments. 
Specifically, we directly test the original sibling hypothesis proposed by Brim (1958) 
and Sulloway (1996) by adding birth order terms as well as cross-gender sibling 
dummies. As in Table 2, the dependent variable was assigned a value of one if a subject 
selected the tournament payment scheme in Task 5 and zero if they did not. All analyses 
controlled for the same set of explanatory variables as in column (e) of Table 2, but 
some estimates are not presented in the table to save the space.  
In column (a), birth order and its interaction term with a female dummy are 
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included. Columns (b) and (c) include first-born, middle-born, and last-born dummies to 
account for the possibility that the effect of birth order is non-linear. The basis for these 
dummies is a dummy of an only child in the family in column (c). Both columns (a) and 
(b) report no significant estimates for birth order and first-born dummy, but there was a 
significant positive estimate for an interaction between middle-born and female 
dummies in column (c). The null hypothesis that the total effect of being a middle-born 
female child (0.502 and -0.231) is zero can moderately be rejected (p-value = 0.081). 
This result is consistent with the birth order hypothesis proposed by Sulloway (1996), 
where middle-born children are reported to fare less well than their older and younger 
siblings, and thus are more likely to be rebellious.  
Columns (d) and (e) examine the possibility that the total number of 
cross-gender siblings, rather than the relative order among siblings, is important in 
shaping preferences for competition. Along these lines, Brunello (2013) found that only 
having sisters at the age of 15 significantly increased the probability of engaging in 
leadership activities in middle and high school for both girls and boys in the U.S., and 
that it increased the probability of participating in sports clubs for Japanese boys. 
Although no such effect is detected in our analysis in column (e), the number of female 
siblings does decrease the probability of men entering the tournament scheme in column 
(d). Surprisingly, the magnitude of having one sister is comparable to the negative entry 
effect observed among women: having one sister reduces the probability of men 
entering the tournament by 35.3%.  
 
3-2. How much did they gain or lose? 
While some women are averse to entering competitive environments, resulting 
16 
 
in them being underrepresented on the corporate ladder, women with younger brothers 
may gain by making “right” decisions to enter the competition when they are likely to 
win. To assess the magnitude of sibling structure on subjects’ welfare, Figure 3 shows 
how much subjects gained or lost by selecting or avoiding a competitive environment. 
Specifically, it indicates the average cost of over or under entry into the tournament in 
Task 5, measured by experiment-point. The costs were calculated by estimating the 
expected losses or gains from entering the tournament, and then taking the difference 
from the actual points earned in Task 5.14 Tables under the graph show the proportion 
of those who entered the tournament when they should not have (i.e., their expected 
gain for not entering the tournament is higher), along with the proportion of those who 
did not enter the tournament when they should (i.e., their expected gain from entering 
the tournament is higher). Overall, the cost of under-entry is larger for women than for 
men, but the cost of over-entry is smaller for women. However, these costs vary 
significantly across sibling composition: among women, those who have younger 
brothers suffered the least from under-entry as they entered the tournament more often. 
On the other hand, men who have older sisters incurred the least over-entry cost by not 
entering the tournament as much. Interestingly, women who have younger brothers 
suffered from the largest over-entry cost among women; older sisters with younger 
brothers decided to compete too often, even when they should not have based on their 
performance. 
                                                   
14 The expected gains and losses from entering the tournament were calculated by randomly assigning 
each subject into a group of four students 100,000 times in order to estimate their probability of winning 
the tournament in Task 5. For instance, for those who correctly solved 12 mazes, the probability of 
winning the tournament was 18.2%, so the expected gain from entering the tournament (218.4 points) 
would be lower than the expected gain from choosing the piece-rate (300 points). For those who correctly 
solved 13 mazes, the probability of winning the tournament was 36.8%; thus, these participants should 
have entered the tournament because the expected gain, 477.8 points, was higher than the piece-rate 
reward (325 points). It was assumed that the cost of solving mazes is zero for all subjects and that their 
performance was independent of the payment scheme.  
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4. Discussion 
This study explored a previously uninvestigated environmental factor that could 
have a considerable influence on an individual’s decision to compete. We conducted a 
simple laboratory experiment similar to the one designed by Niederle and Vesterlund 
(2007) on Japanese high school students. Our experiment showed that women were 
significantly less likely to choose to compete than men were, which is consistent with 
the findings of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). More importantly, we also found that 
the decision to compete varied significantly according to sibling structure, thereby 
supporting the long-debated sibling hypothesis in psychology from the viewpoint of 
experimental economics. 
One interesting finding reported here that is consistent with previous studies is 
that middle-born females showed a higher propensity to choose the tournament option 
in Task 5. According to Sulloway (1996), middle-born children are “losers in … 
Darwinian calculus,” not only because the higher reproductive value of the first-born 
child encourages parents to invest more in first-borns, but also because a last-born child 
is “the only member of the family to receive parental investment undiluted by the needs 
of a younger rival.” Indeed, according to Salmon and Daly (1998), middle-born children 
are significantly less likely to nominate their mothers as the person they feel closest to 
than first- or last-born children, implying that middle-born children receive less parental 
investment. Surrounded by both older and younger rivals, the disadvantaged 
middle-born child is required to be even more aggressive in the competition for parental 
resources. The results in column (c) of Table 3 hint at this propensity to compete in 
middle-born women.  
Another interesting finding is that men with older sisters were no more likely to 
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compete than women were, while women with younger brothers were more likely to 
compete when compared with women who are only daughters, although this result is 
only moderately significant (column (b), Table 2). This finding is in line with 
Sulloway’s (1996) theory, where he suggests a combined effect of birth order and 
cross-gender sibling dynamics on older sister / younger brother pairs. While Sulloway’s 
(1996) explanation is derived from evolutionary science, where older siblings have 
advantages when competing for parental investments, other psychological mechanisms 
are also thought to play a role. Stewart (1983) observed the behaviors of preschool 
children when they were left alone with their infant siblings, and found that older 
siblings were most active when caring for their younger cross-gender siblings. Older 
sisters in particular tended to give far more care to their younger brothers than was 
sought (Stewart, 1983). This study, along with that of Brim (1958), indicate that 
younger brothers with “meddlesome” older sisters may not have to compete as much for 
the limited resources of parents, which may have provided them with fewer 
opportunities to nurture their competitive attitudes. Thus, the systematic trend observed 
in the preference for competition among older sister and younger brother pairs may 
arise not only from sibling competition, as originally suggested by evolutionary science, 
but also from an interaction specific to this pair, as raised in some psychological studies. 
Finally, and most importantly, our study lends support for institutional reforms 
that promote interactions between women and younger men. Exposing women to 
experiences where they are in a position to overrule younger men may help cultivate 
their willingness to compete with men. This tactic may be especially effective in 
patriarchal societies and should be started at an early age, as observed by Stewart 
(1983).  
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Figure 1. Overview of Basic Screen 
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button. 
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the arrow keys. 
Numbers of correctly solved mazes for the 
completed tasks. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics (mean) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age 16.90 16.82
Number of siblings 1.10 0.96
Number of female siblings 0.68 0.60
Birth order 1.51 1.52
Tournament Choice in Task 5 (=1) 0.61 0.23
Tournament Choice in Task 6 (=1) 0.37 0.27
Task 1 performance (piece-rate) 11.02 9.88
Task 2 performance (tournament) 12.00 10.74
Task 3 performance (piece-rate) 12.51 11.44
Task 4 performance (tournament) 12.24 11.63
Task 5 performance (choice) 12.95 11.71
Guessed rank in Task 3 2.17 2.51
Guessed rank in Task 4 2.15 2.54
Average points earned per Task 437.70 343.44
Cost of over-entry (Task 5) 67.07 36.17
Cost of under-entry (Task 5) 203.05 288.83
Number of Observations 41 94
Male Female
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Figure 2. Proportion of participants who chose to compete in Task 5 by sibling 
composition 
Note. The leftmost bar indicates the proportion of tournament entries for subjects who have an older 
brother, for instance. 
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Table 2. Probit of decision to compete in Task 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) (c ) (d) (e)
Female -0.569*** -0.371** -0.376*** -0.310*** -0.323***
(0.110) (0.148) (0.088) (0.098) (0.092)
Submitting the tournament in Task 6 0.272** 0.220**
(0.127) (0.106)
Performance in Task 4 0.003 0.012 0.010
(0.032) (0.024) (0.030)
Differences in performances (Task3 - Task4) -0.057 -0.0678*** -0.0552*
(0.040) (0.026) (0.033)
Guessed rank in Task 4 -0.163** -0.172*** -0.177**
(0.081) (0.066) (0.075)
Has any younger brothers -0.327 -0.283
(0.262) (0.192)
Has any younger brothers * female 0.314** 0.490***
(0.128) (0.184)
Has any older brothers 0.060 0.170
(0.217) (0.190)
Has any older brothers * female -0.032 -0.131
(0.261) (0.316)
Has any younger sisters -0.250** -0.228
(0.108) (0.203)
Has any younger sisters * female 0.334 0.178
(0.244) (0.230)
Has any older sisters -0.245** -0.350**
(0.116) (0.193)
Has any older sisters * female 0.440** 0.348**
(0.182) (0.156)
Number of Observations 135 135 135 135 135
Log Likelihood -73.14 -64.4 -78.57 -71.59 -69.19
Psuedo R-squared 0.162 0.262 0.0995 0.179 0.207
Note. This table reprents the marginal effects from probit model estimation. The dependent variable is given a value of 1 if the subject
selected the tournament payment scheme in Task 5, else it is assigned a 0. Marginal effects are evaluated for a female with an average
number of correct answers in Tasks 3 and 4, who chooses the tournament option, believes she is ranked second on Task 4, and has a
younger brother. The base for the sibling dummies is an only child.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.075, * p<0.1.
Marginal effect (standard error)
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Table 3. The impact of sibling structure on the decision to compete in Task 5 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) (c ) (d) (e)
Female -0.417** -0.349*** -0.493*** -0.391*** -0.277**
(0.187) (0.102) (0.125) (0.123) (0.117)
Birth order -0.00218
(0.136)
Birth order * female 0.0545
(0.168)
First born -0.106 -0.177
(0.180) (0.252)
First born * female 0.082 0.27
(0.210) (0.197)
Middle born -0.231
(0.181)
Middle born * female 0.502***
(0.157)
Last born 0.102
(0.308)
Last born * female 0.156
(0.362)
Number of female siblings -0.353**
(0.181)
Number of female siblings * female 0.374*
(0.216)
Number of male siblings -0.0302
(0.163)
Number of male siblings * female 0.243
(0.204)
Having same-sex siblings only 0.228
(0.204)
Having same-sex siblings only * female -0.219
(0.197)
Number of Observations 135 135 135 135 135
Log Likelihood -72.13 -69.00 -66.71 -65.16 -68.61
Psuedo R-squared 0.173 0.209 0.235 0.253 0.214
Marginal effect (standard error)
Note. This table reprents the marginal effects from probit model estimation. The dependent variable is given a value of 1 if the
subject selected the tournament payment scheme in Task 5, else it is assigned a 0. All estimations control for a dummy to
indicate the choice of tournament in Task 6, the number of correctly solved mazes in Task 4, the difference in performance in
Tasks 3 and 4, and the guessed rank in Task 4. Marginal effects are evaluated for a female with an average number of correct
answers in Tasks 3 and 4, who chooses the tournament option, believes she is ranked second on Task 4, and for columns (a),
(b), and (c) is the first-born child, for column (d) has one brother, and for column (e) has siblings of both gender.. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.075, * p<0.1.
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Figure 3. Average cost of over-entry (Blue) and under-entry (Red) in Task 5 
Note. Bars indicate the average costs of under/over-entry into the tournament in Task 5. The vertical axis 
measures the costs in experiment points. Tables under the graph show the proportion of those who 
entered the tournament when they should not have (i.e., their expected gain for not entering the 
tournament is higher), and the proportion of those who did not enter the tournament when they should 
have (i.e., their expected gain for entering the tournament is higher). 
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Appendix Table. Probit of decision to compete in Task 6 (no maze-solving activity) 
 
 
(a) (b) (c ) (d) (e)
Female -0.159 0.0397 -0.0999 -0.0364 -0.0162
(0.188) (0.100) (0.088) (0.084) (0.095)
Performance in Task 3 0.013 0.0404* 0.024
(0.018) (0.021) (0.025)
Differences in performances (Task3 - Task4) -0.0385** -0.0461** -0.0499**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.023)
Guessed rank in Task 3 -0.139** -0.178**
(0.077) (0.069)
Has any young brothers -0.248 -0.358
(0.314) (0.354)
Has any young brothers * female 0.105 0.066
(0.188) (0.148)
Has any older brothers -0.004 0.157
(0.146) (0.209)
Has any older brothers *female -0.026 -0.107
(0.183) (0.084)
Has any younger sisters -0.142 -0.027
(0.088) (0.102)
Has any younger sisters * female 0.254 0.117
(0.249) (0.227)
Has any older sisters -0.006 0.022
(0.157) (0.152)
Has any older sisters * female -0.100 -0.078
(0.137) (0.104)
Number of Observations 135 135 135 135 135
Log Likelihood -79.07 -64.05 -81.37 -72.38 -67.58
Psuedo R-squared 0.0362 0.219 0.00815 0.118 0.176
Note.This table reprents the marginal effects from probit model estimation. The dependent variable is given a value of 1 if the
subject selected the tournament payment scheme in Task 6, else it is assigned a 0. Marginal effects are evaluated for a female with
an average number of correct answers in Tasks 3 and 4, who chooses the tournament option, believes she is ranked second on
Task 3, and has a younger brother.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.075, * p<0.1.
Marginal effect (standard error)
